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Hawala, an ancient banking system used predominantly in South Asia
and the Middle East, has recently posed a regulatory quandary for law
enforcement and capital markets.' This comment addresses the pitfalls of a
prominently proposed, well-intentioned solution to bring the hawala system
into the modem banking structure and under the regulatory eye of law
enforcement. As will be seen, the inherent nature of the hawala system and
the lender risks associated with privatizing create enormous obstacles to
realizing these privatization efforts. The problem with many proposed
solutions is that they try to impose guidelines upon a system based on
cultural, religious, and consumer needs that vary from those recognized by
the hegemonic political economic structure.
Part II of this comment explains the history, development, and various
uses of the hawala system, involving both legal and illegal transactions.
Part III assesses why the distinct nature of the system troubles the
hegemonic political economic structure.
After an explanation of the hawala system and its problematic
relationship with the goals of the hegemon, Part IV describes three
approaches proposed to curtail the illegal uses of the hawala system. Part
V of the comment discusses the reasons for the enduring nature of the
hawala, providing insight into the needs of its customers, and analyzes the
most prominently proposed solution in light of these consumer needs. Part
VI analyzes the same solution in light of lender liability laws of the United
States, Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates ("U.A.E.").
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University School of Law.
John D. Z. Waszak, Comment, The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist
Financing, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 673, 682-83 (2004) (documenting the Financial
Action Task Force's recommendations for regulatory solutions to these issues).
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Finding these proposed solutions inadequate in light of consumer
needs, Part VII identifies a more practical solution implemented by the
Philippine government and proposes a solution that embraces the cultural
necessities of customers, while enabling the government to regulate the
hawala by controlling the conduits and not the sources of the transactions.
Part VIII concludes that a successful method of integrating the hawala
system into a more transparent system, in order to avoid abuses, involves
not the regulation of the entity itself, but the means by which the entity
conducts its business.
II. THE HA WALA SYSTEM: WHAT IS IT?
The hawala system is an ancient banking system originating, and still
used widely, in the Middle East and in South Asia. 2 Hawala pre-dates the
modern bankin system, having its first known origins in China during the
Teng Dynasty. The growing Chinese tea trade required a means of
transferring money from the south of China to the Imperial Capital without
the burden and risk of carrying large sums of money between the two
locations.4 To solve this problem, provincial governors maintained special
courts in the capital that issued certificates to merchants, who could present
the certificate to the provincial governors and redeem their money in the
2 Joseph Wheatley, Comment, Ancient Banking, Modern Crimes: How Hawala Secretly
Transfers the Finances of Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
347, 349 (2005) (citing Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms:
Hearing before the S. Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin., 107th Cong. 45-49 (2001)
(statement of Patrick Jost, SRA International); LISA C. CARROLL, INTERPOL, ALTERNATIVE
REMITTANCE SYSTEMS DISTINGUISHING SUB-SYSTEMS OF ETHNIC MONEY LAUNDERING IN
INTERPOL MEMBER COUNTRIES ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT (2000), available at
http://www.interpol.com/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney/default.asp
; Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering
Typologies 2002-2003, at 6 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/34037958.pdf; U.S. Gen. Acc. Off., No. GAO-04-163, Terrorist
Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists' Use of Alternative
Financing Mechanisms 18 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04163.pdf, CHRISTINE HOWLETT, INVESTIGATION & CONTROL OF MONEY
LAUNDERING VIA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE & UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEMS 5 (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.churchilltrust.com.au/Fellows%20Reports/Howlett%20
Christine%202000.pdf, Mian Ahad Hayaud-Din, The Hawallah Network: Culture and
Economic Development in Afghanistan, 78 INT'L SOC. SCI. REV. 21, 21 (2003); PATRICK M.
JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, INTERPOL, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM
AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.interpol.int/
Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp (describing alternative
remittance systems); Michelle Cottle, Eastern Union: Hawala v. the War on Terrorism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2001, at 24).
3 Alan Lambert, Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas:
Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 9, 13 (2002).
4 id.
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southern province.5 The Chinese, who based their system on "chits" or
"tokens," F called the system fai chen, which means "the flying money."17
The Arabs adopted a similar system to avoid robbery on the Silk Road.8
The hawala, which means "in trust" in Hindi9 and "transfer" in
Arabic,' 0 serves as a conduit for both legal and illegal transactions, the
former being of economic concern and the latter being of greatest concern
to law enforcement."' To explicate the hawala system, Joseph Wheatley
provides an apt example involving two hawaladars, Khalid and Nawaz. 12
In Wheatley's first scenario describing a typical legal transaction under
the hawala system, Fareed, a U.S. resident of Pakistani descent wishes to
send money to his family in Pakistan.' 3 Fareed then approaches Khalid, a
hawaladar, or money remitter, in the United States who has a counterpart in
Pakistan, Nawaz. 14 Both Khalid and Nawaz own jewelry stores, with a side
business as a hawala broker. 15 Fareed gives Khalid the money he wishes to
send to his family, plus a small commission.' 6  Khalid, in return, gives
Fareed a password that he can email to his family in Pakistan. 17 Khalid
contacts Nawaz and instructs him to furnish the requisite funds to the party
providing the password associated with the transaction. 18 Fareed's family
in Pakistan, equipped with the password sent to them via email from
Fareed, obtains the money from Nawaz, minus the commission.9 In this
way, no money has physically crossed international borders.2 0
To resolve the inevitable issue of debt obligation transfers between the
two hawaladars, the hawala system allows for the transfer of debt from one
5 id.
6 Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of
Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law, 50 VILL. L. REv. 583, 620
(2005).
7 Lambert, supra note 3, at 13.
8 Id.
9 Morais, supra note 6, at 619.
10 John F. Wilson, Hawala and Other Informal Payment Systems: an Economic
Perspective, Seminar on Monetary and Financial Law 2 (Mar. 16, 2002), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the International Monetary Fund).
11 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 348-51.
12 See id.
13 Id. at 349.
14 Id. at 349-50.
15 Id.
16 id.
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hawaladar to another over a series of transactions. 2 Built on a foundation
of trust among the network of hawaladars, each money remitter pays back
his debt through the series of transactions, which eventually equalize the
position of one hawaladar against another.22 In a larger network, Nawaz
may owe money to a third hawaladar (residing in the United States), and
Khalid could settle his debt with Nawaz by directly paying the third party.23
In Wheatley's second scenario, Khalid and Nawaz are engaged in an
ongoing business relationship as 2jewelers.24  Involving the illegitimate
process of invoice manipulation,2 through conventional bank transfers,
gold and precious gem smuggling, or printed currency shipments, Khalid
sends Nawaz $3,000 worth of jewelry but only charges him for $2,000.26
Through this "underinvoicing," Khalid has easily settled a $1,000 debt to
Nawaz.27
28Conversely, Nawaz may owe Khalid money. In such cases, Khalid
sends Nawaz $2,000 worth of jewelry but charges him $3,000.29
Accordingly, by this "overinvoicing," $1,000 entered the United States
covertly. 
3
Fundamentally, these transactions and these networks' functionalities
hinge on relationships based on trust and social connections. 31 To preserve
21 Id. at 350-51.
22 Id.
23 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 351.
24 Id. at 350-51.
25 Knowingly and willfully using "any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice" with the
intent to defraud the United States is a customs violation. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2000).
26 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 350-51 (citing Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002-2003, at 19-24 (2003)
(describing money laundering methods), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/34037958.pdf, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering,
Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999-2000, at 6 (Feb. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/29/37/34038120.pdf; Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The
Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan 12 (World
Bank, Working Paper No. 13, 2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ (type in
Search Documents and Reports: Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala
System in Afghanistan ) (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
27 id.
28 See id. at 351.
29 id.
30 See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing invoice
manipulation by hawaladars).
31 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 350-51 ("[H]awala debt.., tends to require a more formal
process of account balancing using conventional bank transfers, gold and precious gem
smuggling, and printed currency shipments. Invoice manipulation (a customs violation)
could also obscure hawala transfers .... As a result, piercing the veil of secrecy around
hawala has presented a challenge for law enforcement.").
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these relationships, secrecy veils the hawala system. 32 Secrecy becomes
especially necessary where illegal transactions constitute an element of the
hawala debt transfers.33 Hawaladars engaged in illegal transactions often
operate fagade businesses with high sales costs that serve to conceal the
large sum transactions (and the two percent commission they receive) from
law enforcement.34 In fact, many hawaladars will publicly disavow their
profession and invariably refuse to discuss it altogether.
III. WHY WE CARE
The international community should be concerned with the hawala
system and its unregulated nature for two reasons. First, the lack of
transparency creates an imperfect picture of global economic health.36
According to the efficient capital markets theory, market prices are
economically efficient because all information about the capital markets is
available to analysts.37 The lack of records, let alone the lack of regulation,
synonymous with the hawala system 38 indicates that there are gaps in
information. Because of these gaps, the market remains on unsteady
ground and could eventually erode economic stability.
39
Second, because of its secretive nature, the unregulated hawala system
has become an appealing alternative for money launderers. 40 As Natarajan
explains, it is inevitable that financial institutions will be necessary for the
money laundering operation. 4 1 To that end, governments fear that when
criminals use credit and financial institutions to launder their proceeds, the
32 Michelle Cottle, Eastern Union: Hawala v. the War on Terrorism, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 15, 2001, at 24.
33 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 350.
34 Cottle, supra note 32, at 24 (describing Cottle's personal experience with a
hawaladar).
35 Id.
36 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory & Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) ("A market in which prices always 'fully reflect' available
information is called 'efficient."').
37 Id.
38 See Cottle, supra note 32, at 24.
39 See Fama, supra note 36, at 387-88 ("But though transaction costs, information that is
not freely available to all investors, and disagreements among investors about the
implications of given information are not necessarily sources of market inefficiency, they are
potential sources.").
40 See Kavita Natarajan, Note, Combatting India's Heroin Trade through Anti-Money
Laundering Legislation, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2014, 2017-21 (1998) ("[Anti-money
laundering] statutes compel professional money launderers to find alternative methods to
introduce the funds into the mainstream financial system ... [M]oney laudering is further
complicated by the ancient underground form of banking known as Hawala.").
41 Id. (citing Nicholas Clark, The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation on
Financial Intermediaries, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 467, 470 (1996)).
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economic stability of these systems erode.42
Natarajan notes that the hawala system has been used frequently in
drug trafficking in India, especially heroin trafficking. 43  In the post-
September 11, 2001 era, terrorist financiers are using hawalas to evade the
increased reporting regulations introduced by the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act") and its international
counterparts. 4 Hawalas provide the perfect environment to avoid financial
auditors and law enforcement officials as they have no detailed record
keeping, no governmental registration, and limited connections to
"mainstream banking., 45
Thus, being able to capture a more transparent view of the hawala
system and curtail its illegal use is of pressing concern to policy makers and
economists alike. To that end, academics and scholars have proposed
several strategies.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACHES TO CURTAIL ILLEGAL USE OF
HA WALA
Scholars have offered distinct approaches to curtailing the illegal use
of hawala. One approach recommends enhancing investigative
techniques, 46 while another approach designates civil society as the key
actor poised to delegitimize the hawalas.4 7 A third approach encompasses
alternative remittance systems created to compete with the hawala
system. 48
42 Council Directive 91/308/EEC, Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC) (explaining that where "credit and
financial institutions are used to launder proceeds from criminal activities[,]... the
soundness and stability of the institution concerned and confidence in the financial system as
a whole could be seriously jeopardized, thereby losing the trust of the public").
43 Natarajan, supra note 40, at 2059-63.
44 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 359, 363 (citing David Marshall Nissman, Hawala, U.S.
Att'ys' Bull., May 2002, at 13, 16-17, 20-21, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foia-reading__room/usab5003 .pdf).
41 Id. at 357, 374.
46 Id. at 374-75; see Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal
Organizations: A Study into So-Called Underground Banking Networks (1999), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/img/assets/4756/ivts.pdf (advocating international information
sharing for investigative purposes).
47 Jude McCulloch & Sharon Pickering, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism:
Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and Extending Neo-Colonialism, 45 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 470, 471-72 (2005).
48 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 374; Sireesha Chenumolu, Note, Revamping
International Securities Laws to Break the Financial Infrastructure of Global Terrorism, 31
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 385, 420 (2003).
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A. Approach One: Investigative Strategies
The premise underlying the proposed investigative strategies is that
money transferred by the hawala attains usefulness only when converted
into cash. 4 9 That is, at some point in the process, hawaladars must tender
cash to the recipients, like Nawaz must tender cash to Fareed's family
members, 50 though not through a cross-border transaction. In order for
Nawaz to tender the cash to Fareed and others, Nawaz likely maintains a
bank account.51 Where the hawaladar operates a front organization, he
may link the bank account to a front corporate entity; otherwise, it may be
52his own personal account. The argument follows that this cash
conversion requires an inevitable relationship between hawaladars and
banks.53 Therefore, the internal bank investigators can look for particular
indicators of hawala activity. For instance, internal investigators can look
for accounts reflecting high deposit activity, deposits that are cash or checks
from local ethnic customer bases, checks that list secondary account names,
and accounts that indicate outgoing wire transfers to financial centers such
as Great Britain, Switzerland, or Dubai. 4
While these solutions are viable in the United States, curtailing the
illegal use of hawala must be a global effort in order to be successful.
Assuming that the premise is true, and that money transferred realizes its
usefulness only when converted into cash, the proposed investigative
solutions need worldwide enforcement in all private banking institutions.
Without this, money launderers and criminals will forum shop to find
jurisdictions with weaker bank investigating and take advantage of that
single banking jurisdiction to do their business.
B. Approach Two: Positive Strategies
The second approach offers few normative responses, but its positive
statement explains that civil society is the key determinant in the effort to
reduce illegal hawala activity. 55 That is, civil societies using the hawala
system treat it as a permissive activity.56 The logic follows that when civil
societies treat the hawala system as a state crime, hawalas will lose their
legitimacy.
5 7
49 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 374-75; Passas, supra note 46, at 37.
50 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 349-51.
51 Passas, supra note 46, at 14.
52 Id. at 21, 44.
" Id. at 44.
54 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 375 ("Investigators ... identify hawala brokers using
[those] trends and patterns.")
55 McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47.
56 Id. at 481-82.
57 Id. at 481 (citing PENNY GREEN & TONY WARD, STATE CRIME: GOVERNMENTS,
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C. Approach Three: "Western Unionizing" the Hawala
The final approach, with which this comment is primarily concerned,
attempts to challenge the hawala system through an attack on economic
grounds. Because hawala proliferates due to its efficiency, it stands to
reason that if the private banking system were more competitive, hawala
would gradually disappear. Some proposed solutions have included "lower
taxes on remittances, floating currency rates, and the relaxation of currency
regulations and interest rates.",58  This "Western Unionizing" approach
appreciates the power of the consumer in these situations, but, as will be
discussed later, it fails to prioritize correctly the consumers' preferences.
Some governments have promoted alternatives by approving
partnerships between corporate wire transfer corporations and postal
services or banking operations. 59 For instance, Pakistan's state-run bank
collaborated with Western Union, and in India, "[t]he Indian government
approved a partnership between Western Union and national postal service
to operate in cities around the country. 6°
Proponents of these solutions tout the governmental remittance
systems that "compet[e] ... with hawala[s] ... in speed, efficiency of
execution, settlement and delivery of money and services, ' 61 in Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and many Persian Gulf states.62 Both in the Persian Gulf
and in the Philippines, banks or exchange companies offer door-to-door
delivery.63
Seeing the relative success of these door-to-door delivery services,
scholars have proposed incorporating the hawala into the current global
structure. 6 4  Specifically, such proposals suggest that hawaladars form
exchange companies and adhere to reporting requirements.65  This
suggestion and others like it imply that entities like Western Union would
acquire individual hawaladars and incorporate them into the Western
Union corporate structure as subsidiaries. 66  Each hawaladar would
VIOLENCE AND CORRUPTION 4 (2004)).
58 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 376.
" Id. at 367-68.
60 Id. at 377 (citing Western Union, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Jan. 15, 2004, 2004 WL
104818608).
61 Robert Looney, Hawala: The Terrorist's Informal Financial Mechanism, 10 MIDDLE
E. POL'Y 164, 167 (2003).
62 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 377.
63 Looney, supra note 61, at 167.
64 McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47, at 479.
65 Mohiuddin Aazim, Money Changers Not Ready to Go After June 30, DAWN: THE
INTERNET EDITION (Oct. 12, 2003), http://www.dawn.com/2003/10/12/ebr5.htm.
66 NBP Signs Deal with Western Union, DAWN: THE INTERNET EDITION, Jan. 24, 2003,
http://www.dawn.com/2003/01/24/ebr7.htm (discussing the role of Western Union in
Pakistan).
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continue business transactions with his previous clients, but would be
required to adhere to the internal reporting requirements prescribed by the
principal company.
67
V. PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED STRATEGY-CONSUMER
CONCERNS
While this solution theoretically appears to curtail hawala abuses by
making alternative remittance systems more economically enticing, it has
inherent problems. The proposal fails to consider or to meet the six major
concerns facing regular hawala customers when choosing a money
remittance system. First, this proposal does not address the customers'
need for secrecy and anonymity. 8 Second, the alternative remittance
systems inherently cannot compete with the efficiency of the hawala
system.69 Third, privatized money remitters are not as reliable as the
hawala system. 7 Fourth, hawalas have an advantage on the privatized,
regulated systems in Cost. 7 1 Fifth, hawalas are better equipped to meet the
needs of customers not located in large cities.72 Finally, the hawala system
uniquely meets the religious concerns of many of its customers.7 3
A. Problem One: Lack of Anonymity
The hawala's secrecy is just one facet of the system that makes it
preferred by its customers.74 Hawalas, unlike banks, do not require formal
identification. Thus, hawalas provide anonymity to people trying to
conceal illegal immigration or preferring not to leave a paper trail.76
The first inherent problem with privatizing the hawala is the system's
secrecy and anonymity for the consumer. As McCulloch and Pickering
describe, "the informal financial systems are superior in terms of meeting
67 See, e.g., id. ("[The Pakistani State Bank Governor] advised Western Union to
concentrate on remitters based in Saudi Arabia.").
68 See McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47.
69 See Banks Mobilize Expatriate Pakistanis to Send Remittances, PAK. PRESS INT'L INFO.
SERV., Jan. 23, 2003 [hereinafter Banks Mobilize]; Natarajan, supra note 40, at 2063.
70 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 355.
71 Id.
72 See Rachana Pathak, Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm or A
Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2007, 2015 (2004).
73 See McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47, at 479; Pathak, supra note 72, at 2025.
74 Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: Hearing before the S.
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin., 107th Cong. 44 (2001) (statement of Tarik M. Yousef,
Professor, Georgetown University) [hereinafter Yousef Statement].
75 PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, INTERPOL, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE
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community needs.",77 In the post-September 11, 2001 world, typical users
of the hawala system, those of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent,
already are highly sensitized to the heightened government scrutiny,
especially concerning financial transactions. Those users are unlikely to
prefer a system replete with records and paper trails. 79 Even legitimate
consumers like Fareed may desire anonymity and hesitate to draw
unwanted attention to themselves or their family overseas. 80
McCulloch and Pickering further argue that proposing the privatization
of the hawala system is "[c]onsistent with an imperialist mindset and neo-
liberal economic programme.' 81 This notion emphasizes the difficulty in
such a program, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. By
"impos[ing a] standard [that] is the formal banking systems of the
developed world[,] rather than the long-established alternative systems of
less developed nations,"8 2 the proposed solution ignores the consumer
benefits of the inherent covert nature of hawala.
B. Problem Two: Lack of Efficiency
Second, customers prefer the hawala system because of its transaction
efficiency. 83 Hawala transactions often take place within a day or two,
especially with the advances of e-mail and facsimile technology.8 4  On
average, it can take a bank a week to open a bank account and then courier
the money overseas. 85
Thus, the second problem with "Western Unionizing" the hawala is
the lack of efficiency that the private wire transfer system provides
compared to the hawala.86 While exchange companies in Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and the Philippines appear to be competing with hawalas in
speed, efficiency, settlement, and delivery of money and services, 87 the
exchange companies do not face the same stringency of governmental and
regulation requirements that exist in Europe, the United States, and South
77 McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47, at 480.
78 Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding the Civil
Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63,
74-75 (2002).
79 Erich Ferrari, Comment, Deep Freeze: Islamic Charities and the Financial War on
Terror, 7 SCHOLAR 205, 221-22 (2005).
80 Id.
81 McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47, at 480.
82 Id.
83 Adil Anwar Daudi, Invisible Bank. Regulating the Hawala System in India, Pakistan
and the United Arab Emirates, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 619, 628-29 (2005).
84 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 354.
85 id.
86 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 75.
87 Banks Mobilize, supra note 69.
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Asia.88
Where India and Pakistan have implemented governmental liaison
programs with hawalas, they intrinsically cannot contend with the twenty-
four hour hawala transaction time because conflicts between instituting
money-laundering laws and preserving financial privacy disallow a real
commitment to either efficiency or law enforcement. 89 The bureaucracy
inevitably slows the transaction process to a rate uncompetitive with the
hawala.
C. Problem Three: Lack of Reliability
Third, the trust element inherent in the hawala system makes it more
reliable than wire transfers, which are occasionally lost or stolen in transit. 90
More importantly, because of the social network element of the hawala
system, fraud within the system is rare. 9'
Thus, the third problem with privatizing hawalas is that there is no
way to control for the lack of reliability. Western Union has lost wire
transfers, and sometimes couriers steal funds while in transit.9 2 Conversely,
each hawaladar establishes its legitimacy with his customers and other
hawaladars within his network through trust.93 Hawala networks operate
primarily through interpersonal relationships; the stronger the hawaladar's
reputation, the larger a clientele he is likely to obtain. 9 Hawaladars, thus,
exercise greater care in ensuring that funds are not lost or stolen. 95 They
are personally liable for each transaction they facilitate.
The hawala system's advantage over wire services is its reliability.
96
By merging into a larger conglomerate, where funds are fungible and where
there is less personal accountability, the hawala will lose its market share,
and consumers will seek out independent hawaladars. In this way, there is
little incentive for individual hawaladars to merge with larger corporate
wire services like Western Union, especially when they risk losing their
88 See generally Natarajan, supra note 40.
89 See id. at 2063-64, 2069 (The governments of India and Pakistan agreed to exchange
information regarding, "identification, freezing, and forfeiture of property... related money
laundering.").
90 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 355 (citing JOST & SANDHU, supra note 75).
91 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 75.
92 See, e.g., id.
93 Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: Hearing before the S.
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin., 107th Cong. 45-49 (2001) (statement of Patrick Jost,
SRA International) [hereinafter Jost Statement] (noting that even in rare instances where
fraud occurs, other network hawaladars cover the debts of their fraudulent colleague).
94 JOST & SANDHU, supra note 75.
95 Jost Statement, supra note 93 ("[W]hen someone places an order with a hawaladar,
there is little if any doubt that the money will be delivered.").
96 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 355.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:475 (2007)
client base.
D. Problem Four: More Expensive for Consumers
A fourth reason consumers prefer hawalas is because money
remittance in the hawala system costs less than sending money through a
private wire transfer service. 97 Most hawaladars charge an average of two
percent commission per transaction.
98
Meanwhile, if Fareed, from the earlier hypothetical, tried to use a
private bank to send the money overseas, the bank would charge him a fee
to open a bank account, to exchange the money at a higher bank exchange
rate, and to provide courier services offering greater security than surface
mail. 99 All those fees, compared to a ten-dollar hawaladar fee with a one
to two percent commission rate, 100 clearly demonstrate the affordability of
the hawala.
Thus, alternative remittance systems are inherently more expensive
than the hawala system for the consumer. Privatized wire remittance
systems naturally pass on most of the regulatory costs of operating such a
system to the consumers.101 If Western Union acquires a hawala, the
commission fees associated with each transaction will be higher than
commission fees offered to consumers by independent hawalas because of
the newly introduced regulatory costs, presently exemplified in the cost
discrepancy between the two systems.l12 In the case of a bank using
hawaladars as brokers, there are the additional costs to the consumer of
opening checking accounts and paying for courier services. 103
E. Problem Five: Less Expansive
Hawalas reach more remote areas, where larger financial institutions
97 "Western Union charges $22 to transfer $200 from Karachi, Pakistan to New York
City." Wheatley, supra note 2, at 353 (citing Fasih Ahmed, Antiterror Measure Helps
Pakistan, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 21, 2003, at A3).
98 SAMUEL MUNZELE MAIMBO, THE MONEY EXCHANGE DEALERS OF KABUL: A STUDY OF
THE HAWALA SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN 5 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 13, 2003),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/
16/000090341 20031016085357/Rendered/PDF/269720PAPEROMoney0exchange0dealers.
pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2005); see also Philip Bowring, Opinion, War on Third-World
Remittances, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 29, 2005, at 6.
99 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 329.
100 MAIMBO, supra note 98, at 5.
101 Fasih Ahmed, Antiterror Measure Helps Pakistan, WALL ST. J. EU., Oct. 21, 2003, at
A3. Obviously, the regulatory costs depend on the governmental regime, but as will be seen
in the later discussion about lender liability, regulatory schemes, if present, necessarily add
costs.
102 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 354-55.
103 Id. at 349.
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do not have branch offices. 10 4  Because of profitability and technology
capability concerns, financial institutions and wire transfer services locate
themselves in cities, not readily accessible to all the customers served by
the hawala.0 5 In the same vein, hawalas can adapt to unstable situations
that would inevitably debilitate regular private banking functions,1
0 6
because at its very basic level, a hawala's functionality is dependent only
upon the ability for two people to communicate with each other.
While alternative banking systems envisioned and established by
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, other Persian Gulf states, and the Philippines may
compete with the hawala system in cost efficiency and sometimes even in
reaching smaller villages through door-to-door delivery, 10 7 limitations do
exist for a privatized system in a regulated environment. 0 8 For example,
Western Union limits the amount transferred to Pakistan to $1,000 each
thirty-day period, 0 9 and the transaction takes five business days." I 0
These restrictions necessarily inhibit customers, especially in
emergencies. The advantage to using hawalas is their ability to function
even during cataclysmic situations like "wars, civil unrest, conflicts and
economic crisis."" When the hawala network becomes dependant on the
functionality of a private banking facility, the network risks losing its
adaptability, and inherently loses its advantageous expansiveness.
Necessarily, customers will turn to independent hawaladars during such
crises to solve their problems.
Only recently, in the aftermath of the October 8, 2005 earthquake in
Kashmir, crisis tested the liquidity of foreign exchange reserves.' 12
Economic reports about the liquidity crisis established that, "even
104 Yousef Statement, supra note 74, at 44.
105 Id.
106 Daudi, supra note 83, at 628.
107 Looney, supra note 61, at 167.
108 Pathak, supra note 72, at 2013.
109 See http://www.westernunion.com (select "United States" from drop-down menu
below text that reads "Send money transfer online from;" select "Money in Minutes" from
Price Online Services drop down menu; select "Pakistan" as Sending to: country; type "500"
in Amount box; select "New York" as Sending from: state). Western Union restricts online
transfers to $1000 per thirty-day period to Pakistan. http://www.westernunion.com (select
"United States" from drop-down menu below text that reads "Send money transfer online
from;" select "Money in Minutes" from Price Online Services drop down menu; select
"Pakistan" as Sending to: country; type "2999" in Amount box; select "New York" as
Sending from: state; read resulting error message).
110 Pathak, supra note 72, at 2013.
111 Daudi, supra note 83, at 628 (quoting MOHAMMED EL QORCHE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL
HAWALA SYSTEM 9 (2003)).
112 Downslide in Liquid Foreign Exchange Reserves Continues, Bus. RECORDER, Oct. 29,
2005.
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augmented inflows of foreign funds, [in the form of] both.., relief and
enhanced expatriate remittances to help quake-tom relatives, fell far short
of actual foreign exchange requirements."' 13 Economists postulated that
the lack of liquidity shifted movement to informal systems like hawala. 1
4
Accounts like these shed doubt on the viability of government approved
partnerships and the "Western Unionization" of the hawala system,
especially in this particular case where the Indian government had approved
a partnership between Western Union and its national postal service. 115
F. Problem Six: Failure to Address Religious Concerns
The final problem, and perhaps the most difficult for any proposed
alternative remittance system to address adequately, is its failure to contend
with religious concerns. Islam mandates the use of hawalas; the Koran
teaches (or its followers often believe) that the charging of interest runs
counter to the teachings of the Koran. 116 Zagaris explains that investment
companies, like Al Taqwa, provide clients investment opportunities like a
mutual fund, but abide by Islamic law doctrine forbidding "charging
interest or owning anything connected with alcohol, weapons, gambling, or
adultery." 117 Under sharia Islamic law, procedures exist to "provide for the
regulation of commerce and financing.,' 11 8 These procedures, called thick
al muwamalat, mean "'transactions amongst the people."' 19  Religious
leaders have articulated the proper procedures for transferring debt and the
rules regarding hawala to ensure that transactions do not violate Islamic
law. 120 Because the Koran encourages Muslims to "build financial
relationships based on trust rather than contract,"' 121 a "Western Unionized"
hawala system necessarily would entangle the hawala customers in a




115 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 377.
116 McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 47, at 479.
117 Bruce Zagaris, Financial Aspects of the War on Terror: The Merging of the Counter-
Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 45, 70 (2002).
While the United States government may have investigated Al Taqwa for money laundering
violations, their case illustrates not the pristine examples of a hawala, but instead underlines
the connectedness of the hawala and religious needs.
18 Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the
Americas: Introduction, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 13 (2002).
119 Id.
120 See Shi'a Islamic Laws on Hawala According to the Fatawa of Ayatullah al Uzama
Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani, available at http://www.al-islam.org/laws/transactions3.html#
2298 (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (describing basic rules of hawala transfers).
121 Edward Hegstrom, Iranian Exiles in Quandary, HOUST. CHRON., May 5, 2003, at A14.
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Thus, the privatization of hawala requires a thorough consideration of
consumer needs. Ultimately, the problem with this alternative, though
theoretically sound, remains that unless such a privatized system can hurdle
the challenges of providing an anonymous, efficient, reliable, low cost,
expansive, and religiously legal money remittance system, consumers will
continue to rely on the hawala system for their debt transactional needs.
VI. PROBLEM WITH PROPOSED STRATEGY-LENDER LIABILITY
Even if a "Western Unionized" hawala system meets the consumer
needs of secrecy and anonymity, efficiency, reliability, affordability,
comprehensiveness, and religious compatibility, the acquiring bank or wire
remittance system faces risks that greatly outweigh any economic benefit it
may receive through capturing a greater market share of the customer base.
By analyzing the lender liability laws in the United States, Pakistan, India,
and the U.A.E., it will become evident that banks or private institutions
show reluctance to privatize hawalas, even in countries that have been able
to overcome some of the aforementioned consumer obstacles.
A. Lender Liability in the United States
First, in the United States, a country where "informal [money
remittance] networks are very popular with immigrant communities,"'
2
two prominent bank regulatory structures govem American banks. The
Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") and the USA PATRIOT Act impose strict
reporting requirements on American banks, which potentially expose them
to liability if they acquire a typical hawala network that neither regularly
records transactions nor performs customer identity verifications.
B. Bank Secrecy Act
Congress enacted the BSA in 1970 to combat money laundering in the
United States. 123 Amended in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress
added "know-your-customer" obligations for financial institutions doing
business in the United States.124 The record-keeping rules apply to both
licensed and informal systems. 125 In addition, informal money transfer
systems, like hawala, must register as money transmitting businesses.1
26
Hawaladars also have an obligation to file suspicious activity reports
122 Walter Perkel, Money Laundering & Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 183, 200 (2004).
123 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in various sections of
Titles 12, 15, and 31 of the U.S. Code).
124 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272-400, § 326 (2001).
125 Id. § 359 (amending 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A)).
126 Id.
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within thirty days of the detected suspicious activity. 127
By incorporating hawalas into the global financial structure through a
principal-agent relationship, Western Union would still be accountable to
the U.S. Government for obligations to file suspicious activity reports.
128
Because in a traditional hawala system little to no paper trail exists,1
29
Western Union would expose itself to liability daily because of the
challenges it faces in meeting its obligations under the BSA. 130 Conversely,
if Western Union were to require hawaladars to keep detailed records,
customers would likely retreat from using such a system, as discussed in the
above sections.
Additionally, by complying with the regulations, banks expose
themselves to civil liability, which Natarajan aptly describes as naturally
occurring conflicting interests in implementing anti-money laundering
legislation. 131 This conflict is particularly apropos in the hawala case,
where implementing an anti-money laundering regime that includes strict
regulation of the financial industry to avoid criminal liability renders a bank
susceptible to civil liability. 132  That is, although some anti-money
laundering laws provide for immunity from breach of confidence actions if
a bank reports confidential customer information to law enforcement
authorities, those protections are limited in application. 1
33
C. USA PATRIOT Act
The second powerful regime governing transactions in the United
States consists of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act
criminalizes the knowing transfer of funds derived from crimes or from
funds to be used in crimes. 134 If convicted, violators face fines and up to
five years' imprisonment. 
135
Even if Western Union may not "knowingly" transfer criminal funds,
and therefore may escape criminal liability, Western Union may share
responsibility for paying a fine on behalf of the hawaladar, should the
127 Id.
128 See Natarajan, supra note 40, at 2072.
129 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 356.
130 See Natarajan, supra note 40, at 2072 (referring to "know-your-customer laws," of
which the BSA is one).
"' Id. at 2074.
132 Id. at 2074-76.
133 Id. at 2075.
134 115 Stat. 272-400, § 373(b)(1)(C).
131 Id. § 373(a).
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hawaladar be unable to pay, as in a typical principal-agent relationship.1
36
The extent of recourse, however, hinges on how closely the Western Union-
hawaladar relationship resembles a principal-agent relationship. 37  As
Justice Cardozo prophetically wrote nearly eighty years ago, "There is no
doubt that, at common law, a corporation, doing business as a carrier of
passengers or goods, may charge itself with liability for loss on a
connecting line, and to that end may enter, within reasonable limitations not
yet accurately defined, into a joint adventure with another." 138
Thus, for privatized money remitters or banks, the stringent reporting
requirements and the "know-your-customer" laws pose expensive
challenges when dealing with an agent that has little to no infrastructure or
desire to regulate its customers and record its transactions. For a profit-
maximizing firm, increased exposure to liability and increased regulatory
costs may outweigh any revenue increase due to greater market share.
D. Lender Liability in Pakistan
Pakistan is another country where hawala is a popular form of money
remittance. 1 In Pakistan, however, hawala is illegal. 40  In 2002, a law
was enacted requiring hawaladars "to record their transfers and register
with the government."' 4 1 In 2003, the Pakistani government created the
Financial Intelligence Bureau, whose main responsibility is to analyze data
136 See Richardson v. New Century Mortgage Corp., No. 05-60826, 2005 WL 1554026 at
*9 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 16, 2006) (discussing vicarious liability). Although plaintiffs bear the
burden of pleading the principal-agent relationship, once that relationship is established,
vicarious liability applies. It may not be difficult to establish this principal-agent
relationship in the Western Union-hawaladar situation because of the principles of agency
described in the RESTATEMENTS OF AGENCY. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926) ("Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent."); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, comment c (stating that "a person may be an
agent although the principal lacks the right to control the full range of the agent's activities,
how the agent uses time, or the agent's exercise of professional judgment" and "[a]n agent
also has power to affect the principal's legal relations through the operation of apparent
authority, as stated in § 2.03"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (stating that
agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act").
137 See Richardson v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 2005 WL 1554026 at *9.
138 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. at 61 (emphasis added).
139 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 356.
140 Id. at 366.
141 Id. at 366-367 (citing Asad Cheema, Snow Lauds Pakistan's Efforts to Curb Terror,
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on suspicious transactions. 142 Finally, Pakistani law, much like U.S. law,
requires money remitters to comply with reporting requirements. 143
Even with the new laws, there are still many unregistered money
remitters. 144 Because of this, it would be hard for Western Union to comply
with both Pakistani and U.S. reporting requirements, if a transaction occurs
between a party in the United States and a party in Pakistan. Moreover,
because of the discrepancy regarding money remitters' registrations,
Western Union cannot avoid the difficulties in distinguishing between funds
originating from a legal source, that is, through a registered money remitter,
or funds originating from an illegal source, that is, a hawaladar. 
141
Even if the Pakistani government provided Western Union with an
updated list of legal money remitters with whom Western Union could do
business, those money remitters would have to verify that they did not
receive funds from unregistered money remitters. Creating a network of
purely registered money remitters necessarily diminishes the expansiveness
of the system, and the same problems exist in meeting consumer
requirements. 146 In the event that the registered money remitters do transact
with their unregistered counterparts, Western Union exposes itself to
violations under Pakistani law for transacting with illegal money
remitters. 47  Furthermore, the difficulty in discerning transaction
originators poses liability issues under the American "know-your-customer"
laws. 148
Despite Pakistan's efforts to close down illegal money remitting
operations, the use of the hawala system is still prevalent in the country. 14
Yet again, a profit-maximizing corporation is not likely to acquire a
hawaladar and its business clientele while risking increased liability
exposure and acquiring less than a full monopoly. 1 50
142 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 367.
143 Id. at 367-68.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 366 ("[R]eliance on registration and suspicious transaction reports blinds
investigators to hawala brokers that fail to register, operate with limited records, and avoid
the mainstream financial system.").
146 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
147 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 366 (explaining how Pakistan has outlawed hawala, yet
"[f]oreign remittances through banking channels fell from $150 million to $50 million per
month").
148 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
149 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 367-68.
150 Western Union, abiding by Pakistani laws and transacting with only registered money
remitters, cannot obtain a monopoly, because illegal money remittance is still quite prevalent
in Pakistan. Id.
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E. Lender Liability in India
India, like Pakistan and the United States, is a hotbed for hawala
networks.' 51 Yet, unlike Pakistan and the United States, Indian laws are
much less stringent. A 2003 law established requirements for detailed
records of transactions; however, there is no explicit filing requirement for
suspicious activities. 151
Under these more lenient filing requirements, Western Union's
acquisition of hawaladar operations may be feasible. Still, Indian law does
require detailed records of transactions, which may pose problems for the
acquiring institution.1 53  For example, in the instance where a criminal
entity utilizes the services of a Western Union-affiliated hawaladar to
launder its dirty money, Western Union will likely be unable to produce the
necessary documentation to comply with Indian laws because traditional
hawala systems lack the infrastructure and incentive to manage or create a
paper trail of their customers. 1 54 Again, though Western Union may require
affiliate hawaladars to keep detailed records, Western Union may be unable
to avoid liability from actions of its agents. 155
The liability associated with hawaladars engaging in illegitimate
transactions would necessitate intensive background checks on hawaladars
whom Western Union will employ or acquire. Unfortunately, these checks
will likely be both expensive and ineffective because of the aforementioned
difficulty in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate transactions,
particularly because of the lack of record keeping, a paramount
underpinning of the hawala system. 1
56
Finally, even if Western Union surmounts these obstacles, it will still
face liability in the United States for cross-border transactions that enter the
jurisdiction of the United States. 157 The risks and costs associated with
background checks for every hawaladar employed and constant verification
of the legitimacy of its transactions would likely prevail over the benefit to
a greater market share that it might enjoy after acquisition of the individual
hawaladars.
151 See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering
Typologies 1999-2000, at 6 (Feb. 3, 2000), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/29/37/34038120.pdf [hereinafter FATF Report].
152 See India Code, The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act § 12, (Act No. 15 of 2003)
(India), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/rspaging.asp?tfnm=200315.
153 FATF Report, supra note 151; Wheatley, supra note 2, at 370.
154 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 356.
155 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
156 See Wheatley, supra note 2, at 356.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 122-38.
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F. Lender Liability in the U.A.E.
Lender liability laws are relatively new in the U.A.E. In January 2002,
the U.A.E. promulgated a new money laundering law, which established
disclosure requirements. 158  Specifically, banks and hawaladars are
required to report all movement of cash in excess of $550.159 Additionally,
the U.A.E. government has established limits "on the percentage of paid-in
capital a bank can lend to a single individual or corporate entity."
'1 60
While exchange companies have formed that are competitive with
hawalas, banks are hesitant to collaborate with them in promoting formal
money transfer channels.' 61 The liability is too great for banks that are
required to report the movement of cash in excess of $550. If Western
Union, in place of the U.A.E.-based banks, entered into a parent-subsidiary
relationship with the hawaladars, it would likely experience the same
reporting challenges. 1
62
Though some may counter that the U.A.E. is not likely to enforce the
reporting requirements, illustrative evidence of banks hesitating from
coordinating with the hawaladars163 suggests the existence of a very real
and present apprehension of enforcement by the government. Again, even
if the U.A.E. does not enforce the regulations, Western Union must contend
with the U.S. laws as a U.S. corporation. The "know-your-customer" laws
still apply, and Western Union must report suspicious activities. 164 Thus,
such lender liability presents an overwhelming and costly challenge that
may be more precarious than the economic benefit is worth.
VII. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
Seeing that lender liability laws and consumer needs will likely
preclude the existence or sustainability of a privatized hawala system, the
issue necessarily turns to what solution will work to bring the hawala
system into the current, formal, global, financial structure or, at the very
least, into a functional regulatory framework. Some countries, like the
Philippines, have adopted regulatory regimes that regulate the tools money
158 Wheatley, supra note 2, at 365.
159 Jon Marks, UAE Strives To Be the Gulfs No. 1, BANKER, Sept. 2002, at 179;
Wheatley, supra note 2, at 365.
160 Robin Allen, UAE to Tighten Rules for 'Terrorist' Cash System, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2002, at 12.
161 M.S. Rafique at 2005 UAE Central Bank Hawala Seminar, available at
http://centralbank.ae/pdf/Hawala2005/Presentation%20(Slides)%202.pdf [hereinafter
Rafique Slides].
162 See supra notes 128-30130 and accompanying text.
163 Rafique Slides, supra note 161.
164 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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remitters use instead of regulating the money remitters themselves. 
165
In the Philippines, few people have bank accounts and even fewer have
credit cards. 166 Like the typical hawala consumer, Filipinos living in rural
areas lack access to bank branches, thus increasing travel and time expenses
for routine financial transactions. 167 However, nearly forty-two percent of
Filipinos have mobile phones. 168 The Philippine government, recognizing
the prevalent use of cellular and mobile technology as the primary conduit
for remittance transactions, delegated supervisory and regulatory powers
over mobile phone operators to the central bank. 169  Despite imposed
volume limitations 170 that may inhibit the true functionality of the hawala
system, the premise of a tangential approach to regulating hawalas as
opposed to a more direct offensive seems better tailored for the subtle
nature of the hawala.
Another possibility for the unique success achieved in the Philippines
could be the relatively low volume of remittance transactions compared to
other countries. Informal evidence suggests that in 2000, even before the
2001 enactment of the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering laws, the amount
of money transmitted through informal Philippine channels constituted a
small proportion of the total hawala remittances in recipient countries. 171
With a less significant volume, and consequently fewer channels to
regulate, finding a single tool, like mobile or cellular technology, is easier
than attempting to combat hawala transactions where more money and
more networks implicate multiple tools that the government might have to
regulate.
A more practical approach to combating abuses of the hawala system
should account for the inherent values of the system lauded by customers.
Economic competitiveness alone is not the answer. From a culturally
165 Presentation by Austin Belton, Asian Development Bank, 2005 Hawala Conference,
available at http://centralbank.ae/pdf/Hawala2005/hawala%20conference%20
presentation%20.pdf [hereinafter Belton Presentation].
166 Joey Mendoza, presentation at ADB-IDB/IMF UNDP Joint Conference on
Remittances (Sept. 12-13, 2005), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/
2005/ADB-IADB-MIF-UNDP/mendoza.pdf. Mendoza represented G-Xchange, marketing
mobile technology that enables consumers to transfer money to other mobile phones with
explicit anti-money laundering provisions. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Belton Presentation, supra note 165.
170 Id.
171 See John F. Wilson, Hawala and Other Informal Payment Systems: an Economic
Perspective, Seminar on Monetary and Financial Law 11 (Mar. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the International Monetary Fund) (arguing that the decrease in
volume of remittances is due to "improvements and cost reductions for banking channels,
and also [the] unification of the exchange rate some time ago").
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relative perspective, economics is a factor, but other factors exist in
deciding how to transfer money. Governments will need to be creative and
assess the means by which hawaladars conduct their business. No catchall
solution will cure the problem of hawala abuse. Though generally
following the same premise, each country and each network uses different
mechanisms, and it is up to each government to regulate those mechanisms.
While the regulation of mobile technology addresses hawala use in the
Philippines, it may be impractical in the United States, where constitutional
constraints and the populace's value of privacy would lead citizens to decry
such legislation. Moreover, it may be that American hawaladars
predominantly use email, making cell phone regulation inappropriate.
Thus, an appropriate solution involves governmental efforts to
understand the hawala mechanisms within their respective countries and
construct innovative solutions to attack subtly procedural tools instead of a
direct assault on the front-end or back-end of the transactions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
After assessing a predominant solution proposed by scholars in the
area, it becomes clear that a "Western Unionizing" of the hawala system
falls short of consumer expectations and poses too great of a risk for
corporate entities required to assume liability for undocumented
transactions. Seeing this, one must conclude that a viable solution would
contemplate the consumer incentives for using the hawala system and the
mechanisms used by hawaladars in the country trying to regulate the
hawala system.
